This research investigates conditions under which a cooptation strategy reduces "revolutionary" action by subordinates against a group leader. Cooptation is a strategy whereby group leaders offer inducements to subordinates in order to avert the threat of a "revolutionary" coalition. Two experimental studies will investigate the impact of four variables on the success of a cooptation strategy: (a) the size of the inducement offered by the leader, (b) the leader's stated reason for offering the inducement, (c) the degree of reward inequity in the group, and (d) status differences between the subordinates. These variables are investigated in a laboratory setting where a group leader treats subordinates unfairly, and the subordinates can form a coalition to fine the leader. To reduce "revolutionary" coalitional action by subordinates, the group leader attempts to coopt one of the subordinates by offering him an inducement. The success of this cooptation strategy is measured by the frequency and severity of coalitional action by subordinates. This research should provide a better understanding of the ways in which group leaders can use inducements, rather than coercion, to reduce revolts and deal with their underlying "causes".